Background: Currently preterm births are the leading causes of newborn deaths and newborn mortality in developed countries. Infants born prematurely remain vulnerable to many acute complications and long-term disabilities. There is a growing concern surrounding the moral and ethical implications of the complex and technological care being provided to extremely low birth weight infants in neonatal intensive care units in the developed nations. Research purpose: The purpose of this study was to describe the ethical and moral issues that neonatal intensive (...) care nurses experience when caring for low birth weight preterm infants and their families. Research design: A phenomenological method design was used to describe the lived experiences of nurses with ethical and moral issues encountered in the neonatal intensive care unit. One-on-one, semi-structured interviews using open-ended questions were used to gather data from the participants. Research participants: The setting for this study was a 97-bed neonatal intensive care. A total of 16 female nurses were interviewed. Ethical considerations: Approval to conduct the research study was obtained from the institutional review board of the hospital where the study was conducted. Formal signed consent was obtained from each participant. To ensure confidentiality, each participant was asked to choose a confederate name to be used in the interview and the transcriptions. Findings: The thematic analysis identified five recurring themes: (a) at the edge of viability, (b) infant pain and discomfort, (c) crucial decisions, (d) communicating with parents, and (e) letting go. Conclusion: Neonatal intensive care unit nurses indicated that they often had challenges to their own sense of morality as they struggled to protect the infant from pain and unnecessary discomfort, provide care to an infant and their family whom they thought was faced with a lifetime of challenges and poor health, accepting decisions made by parents, and feeling as if parents were not adequately informed about outcomes. (shrink)

This volume contains C. D. Broad's Cambridge lectures on Ethics. Broad gave a course of lectures on the subject, intended primarily for Part I of the Moral Sciences Tripos, every academic year from 1933 - 34 up to and in cluding 1952 - 53 (except that he did not lecture on Ethics in 1935 - 36). The course however was frequently revised, and the present version is es sentially that which he gave in 1952 - 53. Broad always wrote out (...) his lectures fully beforehand, and the manuscript on Ethics, although full of revisions, is in a reasonably good state. But his handwriting is small and close and in places difficult to decipher. I therefore fear that some words may have been misread. There was an additional complication. In the summer of 1953 Broad revised and enlarged two sections of the course, namely the section on "Moore's theory" and that on "Naturalistic theories" (both sections occur in Chapter 4). The revised version of the section on Moore is undoubtedly superior to the earlier version, and I have therefore included it. But in my opinion this is not true of the new version of the section on naturalistic theories: although more comprehensive than the earlier version, it is not only repetitive in itself, but also repeats, sometimes almost verbatim, passages which occur elsewhere in the lectures. In brief, the new version is not fully integrated with the rest of the course. (shrink)

Chronic pain patients often miss receiving acknowledgement for the multidimensional struggles they face with their specific conditions. People suffering from chronic pain experience a type ofinvisibilitythat is also borne by other chronically ill people and their respective medical conditions. However, chronic pain patients face both passive and active exclusion from social participation in activities like family interactions or workplace inclusion. Although such aspects are discussed in the debates lead by the bio-psycho-social model of pain, there seems to be a lack (...) of a distinct interest in assessing more specifically the social aspects regarding chronic pain. As a result, the social aspects have yet to be taken into a more thorough theoretical consideration of chronic pain and to be practically implemented to help affected patients. By addressing chronic pain patients’ struggle for recognition, this paper attempts to shed light on some of these social aspects. We base this attempt on a theoretical framework that combines patients’ statements with an adaptation of Axel Honneth’s social-philosophical work onrecognition. Thus, this paper tries to make a suggestion on how the bio-psycho-social model of pain can live up to its name by helping to address more adequately some of the more neglected aspects in chronic pain patients’ suffering than has been possible to date. (shrink)

C. D. C. Reeve develops a powerful new account of the age-old argument over whether the just are happier than the unjust, drawing from a new understanding of Plato's conception of philosophy.

Sense-perception is a hackneyed topic, and I must therefore begin by craving your indulgence. I was moved to make it the subject of this evening's lecture by the fact that I have lately been reading the book in which the most important of the late Professor Prichard's scattered writings on Sense-perception have been collected by Sir W. D. Ross. Like everything that Prichard wrote, these essays are extremely acute, transparently honest, and admirably thorough. I shall not attempt here either to (...) expound or to criticize Prichard, but he may be taken to be hovering, perhaps somewhat disapprovingly, in the background during the lecture. (shrink)

This book, first published in 1975, provides critical and comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of Leibniz.

I will begin this paper by stating in rough outline what I consider to be the relevance of psychical research to philosophy, and I shall devote the rest of it to developing this preliminary statement in detail.

"It is... remarkable that Reeve's is the first new English translation since Fowler's Loeb edition of 1926. Fortunately, Reeve has done an excellent job. His version is not slavishly literal but is in general very accurate. It is also very clear and readable. Reeve is particularly to be congratulated for having produced versions of some of the more torturous passages, which are not only faithful to the text but also make good sense in English. The long and detailed introduction is (...) worth reading in its own right." --R. F. Stalley, _The Classical Review_. (shrink)

In over thirty lines of the Agamemnon I think I discern lurking in the apparatus of modern editions truths unnoticed by recent editors, and needing for the most part merely redivision, repunctuation, or reaccentuation to become recognizable. At a few points I offer alternative interpretations of readings that have been accepted by some at least among modern editors.

Several philosophers have developed accounts to dissolve the apparent conflict between deterministic laws of nature and objective chances. These philosophers advocate the compatibility of determinism and chance. I argue that determinism and chance are incompatible and criticize the various notions of “deterministic chance” supplied by the compatibilists. Many of the compatibilists are strongly motivated by scientific theories where objective probabilities are combined with deterministic laws, the most salient of which is classical statistical mechanics. I show that, properly interpreted, statistical mechanics (...) is either an indeterministic theory or else its probabilities are not chances, just as incompatibilism demands. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.